Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as corporate activities and their 7 impacts on different social groups. In this paper, CSR is considered in a two-echelon supply 8 chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm that are bound by a wholesale 9 price contract. CSR performance (the outcome of CSR conduct) of the whole supply chain is 10 gauged by a global variable and the associated cost of achieving this CSR performance is only 11 incurred by the supplier with an expectation of being shared with the downstream firm via the 12 wholesale price contract. As such, the key issue is to determine who should be allocated as the 13 responsibility holder with the right of offering the contract and how this right should be 14 appropriately restricted. Game-theoretical analyses are carried out on six games, resulting from 15 different interaction schemes between the supplier and the firm, to derive their corresponding 16 equilibriums. Comparative institutional analyses are then conducted to determine the optimal 17 social responsibility allocations based on both economic and CSR performance criteria. Main 18 results are furnished in a series of propositions and their implications to the real-world business 19 practice are discussed. The key findings are threefold: Under the current model settings, (1) the 20 optimal allocation scheme is to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate 21 restrictions on the corresponding rights to determine the wholesale price; (2) Inherent conflict 22 exists between the economic and CSR performance criteria and, hence, the two maxima cannot 23 be achieved simultaneously; (3) Although integrative channel profit is not attainable, the system-24 wide profit will be improved by implementing optimal social responsibility allocation schemes. 25
Introduction 28
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as corporate activities and their impacts on 29 * Correspondence author, phone: 519-253-3000 ext 3456, fax: 519-973-7073, e-mail: kwli@uwindsor.ca different social groups, including human rights, environment protection (e.g. recycling used 30 product), pollutant emission control, philanthropy, to name a few (Cater and Jennings 2002) . 31 CSR has been receiving considerable attention in the academic community, from the CSR 32 construct in the 1950s (Bowen 1953) to empirical investigations on the relationship between 33 CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP) 1 and, then, to formal modeling of CSR (Baron 34 2001 , 2007 , Calveras et al. 2007 , Giovanni and Giacinta 2007) . In recent years, with the 35 continued trend of globalization, the research on supply chain management has enabled firms to 36 improve their profitability by fostering partnership with other members in their supply chain 37 systems. While firms enjoy improved efficiency, pressures are also accumulating for socially and 38 environmentally responsible supply chain practice (Linton et al. 2007 ). For instance, many 39 leading brands such as Nike, GAP, Adidas, and McDonalds have been urged to incorporate social 40 responsibility into their supply chains (Amaeshi et al. 2008) . In response to this pressure, many 41 supply chain primary firms have introduced codes of conduct to ensure their partners' business 42 practices to be socially responsible. However, World Bank (2003) reports that implementing 43 codes of conduct is challenged by a plethora of individual CSR codes, the effectiveness of the 44 top-down CSR strategies and insufficient understanding of business benefits. 45
Note that even if a lobby group (e.g., non-governmental organizations) for social 46 responsibility may only target a particular firm in a supply chain, the pressure can be easily 47 propagated to other members in the system through their business transactions. Therefore, it is 48 necessary to extend the traditional CSR beyond a single firm's boundary and consider it within a 49 supply chain context (Davis et al. 1997; Mamic 2005) . Recent research has started to model 50 social responsibility in supply chain operations. For instance, Savaskan et al. (2004) develop a 51 model for closed-loop supply chains with product remanufacturing and identify an appropriate 52 supply chain structure for original equipment manufacturers. Crutz (2008) introduces a dynamic 53 multi-criteria decision-making framework for modeling and analyzing the equilibrium of supply 54 chain network with environmental responsibility where environmental (social) responsibility is 55 assumed to have no direct impact on market demand and the allocation of environmental (social) 56 responsibility is not explicitly considered. In Hsueh and Chang's (2008) three-tier (manufacturer, 57 distributor and retailer) supply chain network model, the allocation of CSR for system-wide 58 optimization is captured by additional monetary transfers (via an enforceable agreement), and 59 this treatment allows for the assumption of each decentralized manufacturer's marginal 60 production cost to be the same as that in the centralized network. For empirical studies, Carter et 61 al. (2000) show that environmental purchasing has significant impacts on both income and cost. 62
Cater and Jennings (2002) find a positive relationship between CSR and supplier performance. 63
Although these studies attempt to incorporate social responsibility into supply chain 64 management, the allocation of social reasonability has not emerged as a main focus, whereas it is 65 a critical issue for supply chain members to collaboratively manage the extended CSR. As 66 OECD (2001) states, "allocating responsibility and determining who is the producer [the 67
responsibility holder] are two of the most important [EPR, Extended Producer Responsibility] 68 policy issues." On the one hand, the principles of corporate legal personality and separate 69 existence of corporations naturally reject the extension of the responsibility of one member to 70 any others. In this respect, all members in a supply chain are responsible for only their own 71 actions. But on the other hand, the stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) argues that each supply 72 chain member shares the responsibility for other members' actions. Now a natural question is 73 how to handle social responsibility in the context of a supply chain: is social responsibility 74 independent for individual firms or shared among different entities? This article follows the 75 second argument and treats social responsibility as shared obligations among supply chain 76 partners. In this case, it is crucial to know how the responsibility is allocated among the firms. 77
Otherwise, unclear allocation is likely to lead to the "tragedy of the commons" and result in 78 lower supply chain efficiency. As an example, Amaeshi et al. (2008) suggest that the more 79 powerful member in a firm-supplier relationship should bear the responsibility to influence the 80 less powerful one(s). 81
This research aims to address the social responsibility allocation problem in a two-echelon 82 supply chain under wholesale price contracts. The basic settings of the model are outlined as 83 follows: a two-echelon supply chain consists of two members, an upstream supplier (S) and a 84 downstream firm (F). The investment in CSR always incurs by the supplier, which provides a 85 global measurement of the CSR performance for the supply chain and is assumed to be 86 independent of the production quantity 2 . This cost is then shared with the firm via a wholesale 87 price contract 3 that is an increasing function of CSR investment by the supplier 4 . Three power 88 structures are entertained, F as the Stackelberg leader (first mover) and S as the follower (second 89 mover), S as the Stakelberg leader (first mover) and F as the follower (second mover), or F and S 90 are equally powerful and, hence, move simultaneously (Choi 1991) . Then, our allocation 91 problem is to determine who should be entrusted with the right of offering the wholesale price 92 contract to enforce social responsibility in the supply chain (hereafter, referred to as the 93 responsibility holder) under each of the three power structures. Depending on whether F or S is 94 the social responsibility holder and which power structure is considered, six scenarios may arise. 95
Game-theoretical analyses are first conducted to obtain the equilibriums for the six cases. The 96 allocation decisions are subsequently assessed based on both economic and CSR performance 97 criteria by employing the methodology of comparative institutional analysis that is widely 98 adopted in institutional economics literature (Coase 1960; Williamson 1985) . For the economic 99 performance criterion, the system-wide profit is chosen as a proxy of efficiency to determine the 100 optimal allocation scheme, and this choice is consistent with the concept of strategic CSR (Baron 101 2001) . For the CSR performance criterion, the optimal allocation decision is obtained by 102 maximizing the global CSR performance for the supply chain. on equilibrium variables such as quality/service levels, prices, sales and profits, and it is not a 111 concern how different arrangements of quality/service pricing right affect the supply chain 112 system-wide profit (or efficiency). In this paper, we investigate both equilibrium variables (if 113 CSR were viewed as quality/service level) and the impact of different allocation schemes. 114
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the basic model and 115 the corresponding equilibriums. Section 4 reports our main results, followed by some discussions 116 in Section 5. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 117
The Model 118
Consider a supply chain with two members, an upstream supplier S and a downstream firm 119 F. The global CSR performance of the supply chain is measured by a variable y 5 . To achieve this 120 CSR performance level, certain investment has to be committed. Assume that this cost only 121 incurs by the supplier (but will be shared with the firm F via a wholesale price contract) and 122 takes a quadratic form 6 :
, which is independent of the production quantity. In addition 123 to the social cost, a constant unit production cost c 0 is also incurred by S. The social 124 responsibility commitment by S is expected to be compensated by F through a wholesale price 125 contract that stipulates F to purchase product from S at a unit social-performance dependent 126 wholesale price Given a CSR performance level y, the larger the k value, the more F is taking on the social 131 responsibility for the supply chain. When k is zero, all social responsibility for the supply chain 132 will be solely assumed by S. On the other hand, when k approaches infinity, all social 133 responsibility will be shifted to F. Therefore, it is reasonable to put a cap k on k to make the 134 contract implementable. It is obvious that the wholesale price in (1) serves as a mechanism to 135 share the social responsibility between S and F and k plays a crucial role in achieving an 136 equitable transfer of social cost from S to F. Two key issues in allocating social responsibility 137 between the supply chain members S and F are who should be entrusted with the right of 138 offering the wholesale price contract and what upper limit k should be placed on k. 139 F then sells the product in a consumer market characterized by a demand function 140
(2) 141 where 0 p  and 0 q  are the price and the demand quantity, respectively, 0 b  indicates the slope 142 5 CSR performance can be measured by investment in CSR activities such as mitigating pollutant emission, improving working conditions, philanthropic donations. 6 Röller (1990) theoretically shows that a quadratic cost function can behave well for analyzing global cost concepts (e.g. diminishing marginal returns) by properly choosing the parameters. In addition, quadratic cost functions are employed in many application studies (see, for example, Perry According to the duality of rights and obligations (responsibilities), the responsibility holder 166 7 The key motivation of assuming 0 0 w c  is to exclude the impact of production cost on the supplier's CSR decision so that we can isolate the supplier's CSR behavior and focus on examining how CSR commitments affect supply chain operations, and eventually analyze the impacts of different CSR allocation schemes on the efficiency of the whole supply chain (the system-wide profit).
is assumed to have the right of offering a wholesale price contract
describes how strong the right corresponds to the social responsibility. Understandably, the 168 greater k is, the larger the margin of wholesale price contracts from which the responsibility 169 holder is allowed to choose, corresponding to a stronger right for the responsibility holder. Given 170 this interpretation, if the social responsibility is allocated to F, it will offer to S a wholesale price 171
by selecting
and also order q units such that its profit F  is maximized and S, in this 172 case, will choose y to maximize its own profit S  ; on the other hand, if S is allocated as the 173 social responsibility holder, it will offer to F a contract characterized by k and determine a CSR 174 performance level y to maximize S  and F will thus select q to maximize F  . Therefore, the 175 allocation of social responsibility is twofold: who is the responsibility holder to offer k and what 176 cap k is placed on k. This allocation decision can thus be depicted by
. As for 177 the timing of the k decision, the base model in Sections 3 and 4 assumes that it is made at the 178 same time as the other decision variable controlled by the responsibility holder. Section 5, on the 179 other hand, examines the situation that k is offered by the responsibility holder prior to the other 180 two decision variables q and y are determined by F and S, respectively. 181
Finally, by combining the choice of a responsibility holder (F or S) and a power structure 182 (US, DS, or VN), six scenarios arise and are hereafter labeled as S-US, S-DS, S-VN, F-US, F-DS, 183 and F-VN games, respectively, where the first letter indicates the responsibility holder and the 184 last two letters identify the power structure. For instance, in the S-US game, the supplier S is the 185 responsibility holder and the Stackelberg leader and, hence, S is entitled to choose k as a 186 responsibility holder and determines its variable y first as a Stackelberg leader, subsequently, F 187 as the Stackelberg follower responds with q to the choices by S. The other five labels can be 188 interpreted in a similar fashion. Next, the six games are examined and their equilibriums are 189 obtained. 190
Equilibriums 191
To make the following analysis meaningful, assume bc a  2 to guarantee the system-wide optimal 192 profit and CSR performance for the supply chain to be greater than zero. The maximum profit of the supply chain system is 201
When social responsibility is not considered in the model with all terms associated with y 203 being removed, the optimal quantity and system-wide profit can be conveniently obtained as 204
The S-US game 207
In the S-US game, the supplier S offers the wholesale price contract ( k ) and chooses y , 208 then the firm F responds with an order q . By backward induction, from (4), the optimal reaction 209 function for F is 210
. Clearly, this profit function is concave both in y for a given k and in k for a given y , 214 thereby validating Zabel's (1970) method of first optimizing y for a given k and searching over 215 the resulting optimal trajectory to find the optimal k . The first-order condition with respect to y 216 is 217
Substituting (9) into (8) and taking the first-order derivative with respect to k yield 219 
(3 ) .
2(2 )
The F-US game 238
The F-US game is similar to the S-US case except that F rather than S offers the wholesale 239 price contract characterized by k. Given y from S, F determines k and q to maximize 240 ( , , ) ( , , )
, the profit for F will only depend on q , and the first-order 241 condition with respect to q immediately implies that, for any
. As y = 0 in this case, k becomes irrelevant. 243 Therefore, although k may assume any value between 0 and k , for convenience, we set it at 244 decreases in k , then the optimal wholesale price contract is 0  k , and the corresponding optimal 246 order is given as
. In summary, the optimal 249 reaction from F is 250
By backward induction, the profit function for S is rewritten as
Thus, the optimal 254 decision for S is * 0 F US y   . Therefore, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the F-US game can be 255 obtained as shown in Proposition 2. 256
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the F-US game can be summarized as 257
The S-DS game 260
In the S-DS game, F chooses q first and, then given q , S reacts with k and y to maximize 261 ( , , ) ( , , ) . To summarize, the reaction function from S is 269 expressed as 270
(11) 271
Given (11) , if the firm chooses
profit function can be rewritten as 273
Due to the assumption 2 0 a bc
concave. The first-order condition with respect to q immediately yields 276
Finally, given that * 0 S DS q   as its denominator and numerator are positive, the optimal 278 response ( ( ), ( )) k q y q from S can be easily obtained from (11) . Plugging them into (4), (5) and (6), 279 one can determine the equilibrium profit for S, F, and the supply chain system. All equilibrium 280 variables of the S-DS game can thus be furnished as Proposition 3 below. 
The F-DS game 285
In the F-DS game, F chooses k and q first, followed by S selecting y to maximize 286 ( , , ) ( , , )
under the given k and q . The reaction function for S is thus 287
(12) 288 Given (12), the profit function for F is 289
This profit function is concave both in q for a given k and in k for a given
permitting the application of Zabel's (1970) method for optimization. Next, we first optimize q 292 for a given k and, then find the optimal k . From the first-order condition with respect to q , we 293 have 294
(14) 295 Substituting (14) into (13) and taking the derivative with respect to k yield 296
and, hence, 298
. By (14), (12), (4), (5) and (6), 299 we can determine the equilibrium variables as shown in Proposition 4. 300
Proposition 4: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the F-DS game can be summarized as 301
, the equilibrium variables are the same as those in the S-DS game; 302
, the equilibrium variables are 303
The S-VN game 306
Under the assumption of the S-VN game, S and F determine their variables simultaneously, 307 where S furnishes k and y and F provides a quantity q . It is easy to verify that (7) and (11) With this result, it is straightforward to derive other variables in the equilibrium as given in 314 the following proposition. 315
Proposition 5: The Nash equilibrium of the S-VN game can be summarized as 316
The F-VN game 319
In the F-VN game, F determines k and q at the same time as S gives y . Clearly, (10) and 320 (12) are the reaction functions for F and S, respectively. (10) and (12) are next solved 321
is a Nash equilibrium for the F-VN game. It is actually the unique Nash 323 equilibrium. As a matter of fact, if 0  y , (10) implies that
contradictory to (12). Therefore,
is the unique triplet that satisfies both (10) 325 and (12) simultaneously, leading to the following proposition. 326
Proposition 6: The Nash equilibrium of the F-VN game can be summarized as 327
Remark: Propositions 1-6 demonstrate that the power structure has a significant impact on the 330 behavior of the responsibility holder. If a supply chain member is entrusted as a responsibility 331 holder who offers the wholesale price contract characterized by k, it seems to behave in an 332 equitable manner only if it assumes the leadership position. On the one hand, if responsibility 333 holder S is the Stackelberg leader, corresponding to the S-US case, it will always share social 334 responsibility with F at an optimal level of * to take 336 its share in achieving the equilibrium CSR performance level. On the other hand, if social 337 responsibility of the supply chain is allocated to S, but it is not the Stackelberg leader in the S-DS 338 or S-VN case, S will always push the k value to its maximum, i.e., *
If there is 339 no restriction on k , i.e., k   , S will not pull its weight but transfer all of its social 340 responsibility investment to F via the wholesale price contract. This observation indicates that 341 the right of offering k for S should come with a restriction on the upper limit of k, which may be 342 imposed by a third party, for instance, a government agency, or through a negotiation between 343 the supply chain partners so that social responsibility is indeed equitably shared. In a similar 344 fashion, one can examine the cases that F is the responsibility holder but not the Stackelberg 345 leader in the F-US or F-VN games. In both cases, F sets * 0 k  and refuses to share any CSR 346 investment with S, eventually leading to no CSR performance for the supply chain ( * 0 F US y   and 347 * 0 F VN y   ). This result shows the other side of the coin: when F is entrusted as the responsibility 348 holder to determine the wholesale price, a lower bound should be placed on k to ensure a 349 reasonable transfer of social responsibility cost from S so that the undesirable case of zero CSR 350 performance is avoided for the supply chain. Once again, this lower limit could be imposed by a 351 third party or negotiated between F and S. 352
In summary, the equilibrium value of the parameter k characterizes how CSR investment is 353 expected to be shared between S and F, and the CSR investment tends to be shared in an 354 equitable manner if the Stackelberg leader is allocated to decide k . Intuitively, in the US and DS 355 cases, the leader's profit depends on the follower's response (or threat) and the leader is thus able 356 to take advantage of its leadership position to stimulate (or guide) the follower by choosing a 357 reasonable k to equitably share the CSR investment. On the contrary, if the follower is entrusted 358 with the right of selecting k , it knows that its decision on k will be final as the leader has 359 already committed to its actions. As such, the follower does not have any economic incentive to 360 pull its weight. In the VN case, neither stimulation nor threat is possible because S and F have to 361 move simultaneously without any prior knowledge of commitments from their partner. Therefore, 362 each party with the right of determining k, in its best economic interests, pushes k towards its 363 boundary ( k in Proposition 5 and 0 in Proposition 6), thereby forcing its partner to take on as 364 much CSR investment cost as possible. 365
Main results 366
This section analyzes the equilibriums and derives the optimal allocation of social responsibility 367 according to the methodology of comparative institutional analysis. Implications on business 368 practice are also explored for the resulting social responsibility allocation scheme within a 369 supply chain management context. 370
Optimal responsibility allocations based on the economic performance criterion 371
In Section 3, equilibriums are obtained by examining each supply chain member's strategic 372 behavior under each of the six aforesaid scenarios. In equilibrium, each member has chosen its 373 optimal strategy to maximize its own profit. Here, we shall employ the comparative institutional 374 analysis approach to investigate the equilibriums and determine the optimal social responsibility 375 allocation scheme that maximizes the total equilibrium profit for the channel under each of the 376 three power structures 9 . 377
The US case 378 From Proposition 1, we have 379
For all 
(17) 407
It is confirmed that * ( ) is the unique optimal responsibility allocation in the VN case. 425
These results can now be summarized as Proposition 7. 426 Remark: Under the basic model setting that CSR performance-related cost incurs only by the 453 supplier, to maximize the channel profit of the supply chain, Proposition 7 indicates that the right 454 to price CSR performance via a wholesale price contract should be allocated to the supplier 455 regardless of the power structure. The corresponding optimal k values are derived therein for the 456 three power structures, US, DS, and VN, respectively. When k is set at a value other than its 457 optimality, Corollaries 1-3 further reveal a range of values within which it remains optimal to 458 allocate the right to S for each of the three power structures. Except for the US case with 459
where it is always better, in terms of system-wide profit, to allocate the right to 460 S, Corollaries 1-3 highlight the importance of placing appropriate caps on k ( # ## ### , , e e e k k k ): within 461 these limits, the system-wide profit will be higher if the right is allocated to S; once these 462 thresholds are exceeded, it would be better to entrust the right to F. Intuitively, if S's right of 463 pricing CSR performance into a wholesale price contract is not appropriately restricted, it tends 464 to abuse the right by shifting too much cost to F, thereby hurting the overall channel profitability. 465
These results demonstrate that the responsibility holder allocation depends on how to restrict the 466 right by placing a cap on k rather than the power structure within a supply chain. In contrary to 467 the suggestion of Amaeshi et al. (2008) that the more powerful member in a supply chain should 468 be held responsible, Proposition 7 tends to partially support the argument based on the principles 469 of corporate legal personality and separate existence of a corporation that each member is 470 responsible for only its own activity if the right corresponding to the responsibility is 471 appropriately restricted. Note further that given 0 c (then 0 w is fixed), the wholesale price ) ( y w is 472 determined by k and y . Therefore, Proposition 7 indicates that, with an appropriate restriction 473 on the right to price CSR performance, the system-wide optimal economic performance can be 474 achieved by allocating the right to the supplier who incurs the investment in social responsibility. 475
It is reasonable to question who controls the allocation right of the contract and how the 476 optimal allocation scheme is implemented. Note that this research assumes that information is 477 complete and symmetric for both parties, and the decision-makers are rational. When the channel 478 profit is chosen as the economic criterion for the supply chain, the comparative institutional 479 analysis suggests that the profit maximization drives S and F to reach the optimal allocation 480 scheme given in Proposition 7. As for the implementation issue, for the US and VN cases, it is 481 confirmed that indicating that F's profit actually goes down by implementing the optimal allocation scheme 487 although the system-wide profit increases. In this case, due to the complete and symmetric 488 information assumption, an appropriate lump-sum transfer payment from S to F exists such that 489 the optimal allocation becomes a win-win solution for both parties. As a matter of fact, let  be 490 the transfer payment, as long as the existence of such a  is guaranteed. Furthermore, the assumption of complete and symmetric 494 information allows for establishing this transfer payment as an enforceable clause of the 495 wholesale contract, which is consistent with the implicit assumption of enforceability based on 496 transfer payments in Hsueh and Chang (2008) as well. 497
Optimal responsibility allocations according to the CSR performance criterion 498
In the US case, Propositions 1 and 2 clearly indicate that 499 * * ( ) 0 ( ), for (0, ) Remark: When the objective is to maximize the channel CSR performance, the current model 530 demonstrates that the optimal social responsibility allocation is to designate S as the 531 responsibility holder and entrust it with the (optimally restricted) right to price CSR performance 532 in a wholesale price contract under each of the three power structures. Corollary 4 further reveals 533 that, even if k is not set at its optimality, a higher CSR performance is always achieved by 534 assigning S as the responsibility holder in the US and VN cases where S is stronger (US) or 535 equally powerful (VN). But for the DS structure where the downstream F is more powerful, to 536 make the weaker player S to be the responsibility holder, an appropriate restriction on the right 537 ( # y k ) has to be imposed; otherwise, the more powerful F will arise as a better choice. Therefore, Remark: Propositions 7 and 8 indicate that the optimal economic and CSR performances could 559 be attained by allocating S as the social responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions on k 560 when each criterion is independently considered as a single objective. Proposition 9 further 561 points out that these two criteria are inherently in conflict with each other and it is impossible to 562 achieve both optimality simultaneously under any of the three power structures. In other words, 563
if the economic performance is to be maximized, the channel CSR performance measured by y 564 will not achieve its maximum, and vice versa. Proposition 9 highlights the tradeoff between the 565 economic and CSR performance criteria. This finding sheds significant insights for supply chain 566 managers (the primary member, in particular) who are under increasing pressure for socially 567 responsible business practices: it might well be the case of finding a right trade-off between 568 social and economic performances. Recent research indicates that supply chain managers have 569 started to address consumer confidence and trust about whether goods and services are provided 570 without compromising ethical and environmental standards (New 2003). 571
Comparisons of economic and social responsibility performance 572
This subsection compares the channel optimal profits, sales quantities, and CSR performance for 573 
608
Proposition 10 is thus proved. 609
Remark: Proposition 10 clearly demonstrates that, with the presence of CSR, the integrative 610 system-wide optimal profit and sales quantity are not attainable via a decentralized system 611 regardless of how CSR is allocated between the two members (S and F) due to double-612 marginalization. Nevertheless, it does point out that the channel profit and sales can be improved 613 by implementing the optimal social responsibility allocation schemes in the decentralized system 614 compared to the integrative case without considering social responsibility. An intuitive 615 interpretation is that the sales are improved because the market demand curve is shifted upwards 616 by socially responsible activities (Propositions 1, 3 and 5 show that equilibrium y is strictly 617 greater than 0, while in the case without CSR, y is always equal to 0), leading to a higher 618 system-wide profit. This enhanced profitability, as discussed at the end of Section 4.1, provides a 619 basis for both parties to improve their individual profitability either automatically or via an 620 appropriate credible transfer payment. Proposition 10 thus helps to explain the recent trend in the 621 business world: more and more companies (often primary firms of global supply chains) commit 622 resources to socially and environmentally responsible activities such as establishing and 623 implementing certain codes of conduct as a means to eventually improving their economic 624 performance 10 . And the prediction of efficiency improvement justifies the empirical findings that 625 CSR is positively related to corporate financial performance (Margolis and Walsh 2001; Orlitzky 626 et al. 2003) . 627
In the proof of Proposition 10 (iii), the assumption of 2 2a bc  is introduced together with 628 2 a bc  . The following arguments are furnished to justify these two assumptions: (1) For a given 629 market demand characterized by a and b , the impact of the CSR investment on the supplier's 630 cost should be restricted to a reasonable range (i.e. ) is less than a. As such, by implementing the optimal allocation scheme, the firm's unit 633 profit margin increases in y (as ( ) a k y  appears in the profit function (4)), leading to the firm's 634 interests in the supplier's CSR investments (otherwise the firm always prefers to 0  y because 635 any increase in y will result in a decrease in its unit profit margin). 636
Discussions 637
In Section 4, when the optimal allocation decision is considered, it is assumed that the 638 responsibility holder simultaneously determines k along with the other variable. This section 639 examines the case that k is first determined by the responsibility holder and then other decision 640 variables are subsequently decided as per each of the six aforesaid games. 641
Corresponding to the six games, S-US, F-US, S-DS, F-DS, S-VN, and F-VN, defined in 642 Section 2, we now modify them by assuming that k is first determined by the responsibility 643 holder, followed by other decision variables. The modified games are denoted as SS-US, FF-US, 644 SS-DS, FF-DS, SS-VN and FF-VN games, where SS and FF indicate that the supplier and the 645 firm are, respectively, assigned as the responsibility holder and decide k prior to other decision 646 variables. Then we change the subscripts of the equilibrium and optimal decision variables in 647 Sections 2-4 in a similar fashion to reflect the corresponding modified scenarios. For example, 648 responsibility allocations for the US, DS and VN cases, respectively. 708
Finally, since the assumption that k is first decided by the corresponding responsibility 709 holder does not have any impact on the optimal responsibility allocations, Propositions 9 and 10 710 follow immediately. Proposition 11 is thus proved. 711
Remark: Two points are worth mentioning here. First, as the responsibility holder's k decision 712 induces the subsequent US, DS or VN game, it has to take into account the subsequent 713 equilibrium variables due to backward induction. This consideration helps to avoid the extreme 714 case of not sharing the CSR investment at all. Second, Proposition 11 shows that Propositions 7-715 28 10 are robust to the change of the sequence of determining k as long as k is appropriately 716 specified. 717
To illustrate the shapes of and relationships among the channel profit functions, a numerical 718 example has been developed for the US case as shown in Table 1 , and the resulting graph is 719 depicted in Fig. 1 (As a matter of fact, the relative relationships among the curves in Fig. 1 can 720 be theoretically confirmed). Fig. 1 clearly points out the optimal allocation at * e k (Proposition 721 11). If k is not set at its optimality * e k and k is offered by the responsibility holder ahead of the 722 other two decision variables, q and y, Fig. 1 Social responsibility allocation is considered in a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a 735 downstream firm F and an upstream supplier S bound by a wholesale price contract. The CSR 736 performance of the supply chain is assumed to be a global variable y and the related cost is 737 incurred only by S and is expected to be shared with F via the wholesale price contract that is 738 characterized by a parameter k. With the duality of responsibility and rights, the allocation is 739 conceived as a two-dimensional vector. The first dimension assigns a supply chain member as 740 the responsibility holder and entrusts it with the right to price the CSR performance in the 741 contract. The second dimension specifies an upper bound k for the key parameter k in the 742 wholesale price contract, which effectively places a restriction on the right of the responsibility 743 holder. The power structure of the supply chain is captured as the Stackelberg leader-follower 744 relationship. Different combinations of responsibility holder assignment and power structures 745 lead to six distinct games and their corresponding equilibriums are derived accordingly in 746 Propositions 1 through 6. By analyzing the equilibriums as per the methodology of comparative 747 institutional analysis, the following key results are obtained: 748
(1) Under each of the three power structures, the optimal social responsibility allocation 749 scheme is always to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions 750 on k based on both the economic and the CSR performance criteria (Propositions 7 and 8). 751
When the economic performance drifts away from its maximum, such restrictions are mandatory 752 
